GRAIN — THE WORLD'S COMMON DENOMINATOR

Where Will the Growth Be for the Grain Industry, and How Should America Respond?

For many years, the U.S. grain business has looked at growth through a familiar lens. We look for countries with more people, rising incomes, and expanding feed demand, then ask how much more U.S. corn, wheat, soybeans, soybean meal, and other products we can sell there.

That is still a worthwhile question. But it is not enough.

The larger question is this: as the world's big grain consuming countries grow, how do we remain a reliable supplier and a useful business partner while those same countries improve their own production, storage, transportation, processing, and trade systems?

The answer will shape the future for farmers, country elevators, regional processors, exporters, equipment suppliers, and the public policy that supports them.

Growth Markets Are Not Just Import Markets

It is easy for those of us in the U.S. grain business to look at a fast growing country and see a future export customer. We see more people, more city growth, more poultry and livestock production, and more demand for wheat, corn, soybean meal, and vegetable oil.

That opportunity is real. But we can make a mistake when we treat every country outside Brazil and Argentina as a permanent importer of American grain and oilseeds.

Many countries we identify as demand growth markets already have substantial domestic crop production. India produces very large quantities of rice, wheat, corn, and oilseeds. China produces immense quantities of corn, wheat, rice, and oilseeds even while importing large volumes of soybeans. Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and many other countries are working to raise yields, reduce losses, improve storage, and build commercial feed, milling, crushing, and transportation capacity.

Population growth creates demand, but it does not automatically create an import market. A country's imports will depend on how fast its farmers increase production, how much grain is lost after harvest, whether commercial storage is available, and whether the crop can move from the farm to the processor, port, or consumer.

The future customer may also become a stronger producer, a regional competitor, and a valuable business partner. That is the more realistic way to look at the world grain business.

The OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2025-2034 projects that global food consumption of cereals will rise about 1.1 percent a year, reaching roughly 1.28 billion tonnes by 2034, driven mainly by population growth in Asia and Africa.

Large Population Does Not Automatically Mean Large Imports

The table below compares major countries by current population, approximate annual grain use, and a directional outlook to 2050. Grain use includes the major cereals used for food, feed, industrial purposes, and related domestic uses. The numbers are rounded to show scale and direction, rather than serve as a precise country balance sheet.

Country	Population 2026	Population 2050	Grain use today	Grain use outlook to 2050	What to watch
India	1.48 billion	1.68 billion	290 to 310 MMT	370 to 430 MMT	A large producer first. Feed, oils, and protein demand can grow faster than some domestic supply chains.
China	1.41 billion	1.26 billion	620 to 650 MMT	620 to 680 MMT	By a wide margin the world's largest grain consumer, on a base that includes rice and a huge feed sector. Population declines, but feed, protein, and processing demand keep total use near current levels.
United States	349 million	381 million	375 to 390 MMT	390 to 420 MMT	Mature domestic use, strong processing and biofuel base, and continued export importance.
Indonesia	288 million	321 million	60 to 65 MMT	80 to 95 MMT	Rice remains central, while poultry and aquaculture raise feed demand.
Pakistan	259 million	372 million	43 to 47 MMT	70 to 85 MMT	Wheat, rice, corn, water availability, and policy all matter.
Nigeria	242 million	359 million	32 to 36 MMT	55 to 70 MMT	Big production potential, but storage, roads, power, finance, and feed growth will determine the outcome.
Brazil	214 million	217 million	125 to 130 MMT	150 to 170 MMT	Major corn and soybean competitor with further feed and processing growth.
Bangladesh	178 million	215 million	50 to 55 MMT	65 to 80 MMT	Rice remains important, with continued wheat and feed ingredient needs.
Russia	143 million	136 million	70 to 75 MMT	70 to 80 MMT	Large wheat producer and exporter. Production and export policy affect global trade.
Ethiopia	139 million	225 million	24 to 28 MMT	45 to 60 MMT	Large domestic cereal base with significant growth pressure and infrastructure needs.

In this table, grain use means total domestic use of wheat, rice, and coarse grains for food, feed, industrial processing, and related uses. MMT means million metric tonnes. Current population figures and 2050 projections are rounded from UN World Population Prospects, medium-variant estimates. Current grain use is wheat plus milled rice plus coarse grains (corn, barley, sorghum, oats, rye, and millet combined) — each country's total domestic use for marketing year 2025/26, per USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Grain: World Markets and Trade (August 2026). The 2050 grain use ranges are directional scenarios built on that base, not official forecasts, and assume population change, some income growth, rising commercial feed use, and continued domestic production growth. China, the United States, and India post the largest totals because their coarse-grain (mainly corn) and rice sectors are so large; the other countries in the table sit on a different scale for that reason.

The point of the table is not that every country will become an import customer for the United States. The point is that the major population countries will have very large and changing grain systems. Their import needs will be set by the gap between domestic demand and domestic production, not by population alone.

A country can have a rising population and still reduce imports if its yields improve, crop losses decline, storage gets better, and logistics work. The opposite is also true. A country with good land and capable farmers may need large imports after a drought, a weak harvest, poor transportation, currency trouble, or a policy mistake.

The Oilseed Side of the Ledger

Everything above is grain — wheat, rice, corn, and the other cereals. Soybeans, rapeseed, sunflower seed, and the meal and oil made from them are tracked separately, and the picture looks different in an important way. A country can be close to self-sufficient in grain and still be deeply import-dependent for oilseeds and protein meal, or the other way around.

China is the clearest example. On the grain side, China grows most of what it eats and feeds. On the oilseed side, it imports roughly 115 million tonnes of soybeans a year, more than half of everything that moves in world soybean trade,  to feed a crushing industry that processes close to 147 million tonnes of oilseeds annually and supports the largest livestock and aquaculture feed sector in the world. Brazil and the United States compete directly for that business.

Country	Oilseed crush	Protein meal use	Vegetable oil use	Note
India	34.8 MMT	18.5 MMT	26.0 MMT	Large palm oil importer for cooking; soybean and rapeseed meal mostly self-supplied.
China	146.8 MMT	113.6 MMT	40.9 MMT	The world's dominant oilseed importer — roughly 115 MMT of soybeans a year, overwhelmingly for crush and feed.
United States	76.1 MMT	46.3 MMT	20.8 MMT	Major crusher and exporter of both meal and oil; competes directly with Brazil for China's business.
Indonesia	13.8 MMT	8.2 MMT	27.6 MMT	World's largest palm oil producer; the oil figure reflects palm, not soybean crush.
Pakistan	6.6 MMT	not itemized (modest)	5.1 MMT	Import-dependent on both palm oil and soybeans.
Nigeria	not itemized (minimal)	not itemized (minimal)	2.9 MMT	Edible oil demand is met almost entirely by imports.
Brazil	68.3 MMT	24.7 MMT	13.3 MMT	World's leading soybean producer and exporter; crushes roughly a third of its own crop domestically.
Bangladesh	not itemized (minimal)	not itemized (modest)	3.5 MMT	Edible oil demand, mostly palm and soybean oil, is met almost entirely by imports.
Russia	27.6 MMT	10.4 MMT	4.1 MMT	Major sunflower oil producer and exporter; most of its crush leaves the country as oil, not meal.
Ethiopia	not itemized (minimal)	not itemized (minimal)	not itemized, likely under 1.5 MMT	One of the more oil-import-dependent countries in this comparison.

MMT means million metric tonnes. Figures are each country's total domestic use for marketing year 2025/26, per USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Oilseeds: World Markets and Trade (August 2026). "Oilseed crush" covers major oilseeds (soybean, rapeseed, sunflowerseed, cottonseed, peanut, palm kernel, and copra) processed domestically; "protein meal use" and "vegetable oil use" are domestic consumption of the resulting meal and oil. Nigeria, Bangladesh, and Ethiopia are not broken out individually in USDA's oilseed crush and meal tables,  their formal crush and compound-feed sectors are small so those cells are marked rather than estimated.

For a U.S. exporter, that difference matters. The grain opportunity described above is spread across many growing markets and is as much about storage, handling, and processing expertise as it is about tonnage. The oilseed opportunity is more concentrated: a handful of very large crushers, led by China, set the pace of world demand, and the competition for that business is mainly a three-way contest between the United States, Brazil, and Argentina on price, logistics, and reliability.

Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa

Nigeria deserves special attention. Its population is already above 240 million and is projected to rise sharply in the decades ahead. It has a large agricultural base and produces maize, sorghum, millet, rice, cassava, and other crops. It also has major poultry and food demand growth ahead.

But Nigeria's future grain position is not simply a question of how much it imports. It depends on whether crop production, commercial storage, transportation, dependable power, financing, feed demand, and private investment can grow together. If those pieces improve, Nigeria can produce and market more of its own grain. If they do not, its import needs can rise quickly.

Nigeria is only one part of the broader Sub-Saharan Africa story. The region has roughly 1.3 billion people today and, per UN medium-variant projections, is on track to top 2 billion by mid-century. It includes large grain producing areas, fast growing cities, countries with strong agricultural potential, and countries with serious weather, infrastructure, financing, or government challenges.

Sub-Saharan Africa should not be treated as one market. It is a collection of many markets with different crops, rainfall patterns, road systems, rail connections, port access, currencies, policies, and business risks. Some countries will become stronger grain producers. Some will remain regular importers. Many will be both producers and importers, depending on the commodity and the year.

The common need across much of the region is better grain storage, lower post-harvest losses, stronger roads and rail connections, more dependable power, better ports, workable finance, and experienced commercial operators. That need creates opportunities not only for U.S. grain and soybean meal, but also for U.S. equipment, engineering, operating practices, training, testing, and supply chain expertise.

Transportation Decides What Is Possible

A good crop does not create a successful grain industry by itself. It has to move.

A farmer may raise a larger crop, but without passable roads, reliable trucks, rail service, inland waterways, commercial storage, ports, and loading capacity, much of the benefit can be lost before the grain reaches a buyer. Transportation cost often decides whether a crop is competitive or stranded.

In many growing markets, a modern feed mill, crush plant, or port terminal may be built near an area where farm roads are poor, trucking is costly, rail service is limited, or storage is short. A country can have good land, good farmers, and rising demand, but still struggle to build an efficient commercial grain system.

That is why the real race is not only for crop production. It is also for roads, bridges, rail lines, port capacity, river access, commercial storage, truck fleets, drying systems, and reliable electrical power.

This is just as true in the United States. We should not assume that our export advantage is permanent. Grain from the Midwest still has to reach the Gulf, the Pacific Northwest, Mexico, or another destination at a competitive delivered cost. Locks and dams, dredging, rail capacity, country elevators, bridges, rural roads, and port terminals are not side issues. They are part of the grain business.

Storage and Handling Are Catching Up

We also need to quit assuming that growing grain markets will always operate with yesterday's storage and handling systems.

Across Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and parts of Africa, investment is going into grain terminals, feed mills, crush plants, commercial storage, drying systems, laboratories, metal bins, flat storage, bulk loading systems, aeration, grain conditioning, and inventory technology.

The level of progress varies widely. One country may have a first-class port terminal and a modern feed industry, yet still have poor rural roads, limited farm storage, and large post-harvest losses. Another may have strong domestic production but lack the financing or public support needed to build an efficient transportation network.

Still, the direction is clear. These countries are improving their ability to store grain, protect quality, reduce losses, and move products into domestic and regional markets.

That can reduce imports over time. It can also create demand for U.S. equipment, design services, operating knowledge, quality control, safety programs, training, and management systems.

The opportunity for the United States is not only to sell a cargo of corn or soybean meal. It is also to help build better systems for storing, handling, processing, and moving grain.

Stability Matters More Than We Admit

Government stability and economic stability do not get enough attention in many grain market discussions.

A country may have strong production potential and growing demand, but investment slows down when policies change without warning, currency values move sharply, import rules are uncertain, capital is hard to obtain, or contracts cannot be relied upon.

Grain storage, feed mills, crushing plants, rail spurs, terminals, and ports require long-term capital. No company wants to build a major facility if tax rules, import duties, currency controls, export restrictions, land rules, or government policy can change overnight.

Reliable rules matter. So do enforceable contracts, access to financing, predictable trade policy, workable customs procedures, stable power supplies, and a government that understands the value of private investment.

For a U.S. exporter, the issue is just as important. A market may look attractive because it has a large population and growing feed demand. But if the currency is weak, payment risk is high, port procedures are uncertain, or policy changes every few months, that market can become difficult in a hurry.

We need to look beyond population numbers. We need to ask whether a country has the economic footing, transportation system, legal structure, and operating environment needed to support a lasting grain trade.

What America Should Do

The United States should compete across the whole grain value chain.

Government policy should protect market access and support fair trade. It should also invest in the systems that let American grain compete. That includes our rivers, locks, dams, dredging, railroads, bridges, rural roads, ports, reliable power, and broadband.

Matching China's Investment Playbook

China is not just buying American grain and oilseeds less often, it is building the terminals, ports, and rail lines that decide where the next cargo goes. Its Belt and Road Initiative has put more than a trillion dollars into infrastructure across upwards of 140 countries since 2013, and its investment in Africa alone nearly tripled year over year to roughly $33.5 billion in the first half of 2026. In Brazil, the state-owned agribusiness COFCO has already acquired a grain export terminal at the Port of Santos and helped develop another at São Francisco do Sul; buying its way into the infrastructure that decides whose soybeans and corn move fastest and cheapest to port.

The U.S. toolkit for competing on that ground splits into two very different jobs, and it's worth being precise about which program does which. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation is the one actually built to be China's counterpart, created in 2018 partly to offer an alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative, with a roughly $40 billion portfolio across more than 100 countries since 2020 and agriculture and food security named as a priority area. But its project approvals slowed sharply through 2025 before Congress reauthorized it that December, and outside reviewers have pointed out that its project mix has leaned toward finance, education, and microfinance rather than the hard infrastructure like ports, rail, and energy that DFC was created to compete on.

USDA's own programs do something different, and it's a fair generalization to say they move commodities and open markets rather than build things. McGovern-Dole and Food for Peace are direct food assistance programs with U.S. commodities shipped as aid. Food for Progress works a little differently but still starts with a U.S. commodity: USDA buys it, ships it, the recipient country sells it commercially, and the proceeds, up to $226 million a year across projects, fund agricultural development there. The Market Access Program and Foreign Market Development program, together about $212 million for FY2026, are marketing and promotion dollars, not commodities at all. And the export credit guarantee program known as GSM-102, recently expanded, backs private financing for buyers of U.S. grain rather than building anything.

Put simply: China is largely buying and building the infrastructure that decides where grain and oilseeds move. The United States mostly moves commodities, guarantees credit, and promotes exports  with one program, DFC, actually built for the infrastructure fight but not yet operating at China's scale or focus. If American grain and oilseeds are going to move through infrastructure built on American terms rather than Chinese ones, that gap is worth confronting directly, not just with more trade missions and market-promotion dollars, but with real capital behind the ports, rail, and storage systems in the countries this piece has already identified as the fastest-growing grain markets in the world.

The United States also needs a practical export development policy. We should help U.S. companies compete for overseas work involving storage systems, grain handling equipment, drying, testing, automation, engineering, maintenance, training, and supply chain management. Those services build long-term business relationships and often lead to product sales as well.

International grain companies will continue to play an important role because they have capital, risk management, terminals, shipping, and established customer relationships. Regional and independent companies have an important place as well. They can remain close to the farmer, move quickly, offer specialized service, and build strong local partnerships.

The competitive picture is not identical for grain and oilseeds, and American strategy should treat them differently. Grain competitiveness is won market by market, often on storage, handling, and reliability as much as price, across dozens of countries at very different stages of building their own systems. Oilseed competitiveness is won in a much narrower field: a small number of very large crushers, led by China, set the pace of world demand, and the United States is really competing against Brazil and Argentina for that business. Both fights matter, and losing focus on either one costs American agriculture a piece of a market that will keep growing.

The world will need more grain and oilseeds. But the winners will not simply be the ones who raise the most bushels. They will be the countries and companies that can produce a dependable crop, store it well, move it efficiently, honor contracts, manage risk, and operate under stable rules.

For American agriculture, the goal should be clear. We should remain a reliable supplier of grain and oilseeds, while also becoming the preferred partner for the technology, transportation knowledge, storage systems, operating discipline, and commercial experience that growing grain economies will need.

There is a real risk worth naming here too. Using tariffs and trade barriers on grain and food as leverage in unrelated geopolitical disputes can backfire on American agriculture, since the same tools can be turned back on U.S. exports. The steadier path is to keep reinvesting in our own infrastructure,  the river system, the interstates, and our rail network and to keep modernizing the supply chain, from country elevators and barge loaders to port terminals.

Crop genetics work also needs to broaden beyond yield and insect or disease resistance to put grain quality back on the table; U.S. corn quality factors of hardness and broken corn and foreign material (BCFM) in particular has become a recurring concern among foreign buyers, and it deserves the same research investment as yield.

None of this is optional, and none of it happens by default. The countries in the tables above are not waiting for the United States to decide how to compete;  they are building their own storage, their own crush capacity, and in China's case, buying the very ports and terminals that will decide whose grain and oilseeds move next. The world will keep needing more of both. Whether America's share of that growth expands or shrinks will be decided less by how much we grow than by how deliberately we invest, modernize, and show up  on the water, on the rails, in foreign capitals, and in the quality of what we load onto the ship.

These are simply the reflections of an old operations grain guy who’s been around for more than fifty years. I had a front‑row seat to the grain‑trading wild‑west of the early 1970s at Continental Grain, when people like Michel Fribourg were helping shape a company that punched far above its weight. Later, I spent decades with ADM and had the privilege of working for one of the premier grain traders in the world, Bernie Kraft.

These thoughts and concerns are my own. I know plenty of folks will see things differently and that’s good. The industry has always been built on sharp minds, strong opinions, and people willing to challenge each other.

My hope is that this blog becomes a place where anyone invested in the future of U.S. grain and oilseeds can share their perspective. We’ve all lived our own version of this story.

Let’s start a conversation.

Best

Grain Guy Fifty